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Abstract
Making negative inferences for negative events, ruminating about them, and retrieving negative aspects of memories
have all been associated with depression. However, the causal mechanisms that link negative inferences to negative
mood and the interplay between inferences, rumination, and memory have not been explored. In the current study,
we used a cognitive-bias modification (CBM) procedure to train causal inferences and assessed training effects on
ruminative thinking, memory, and negative mood among people with varying levels of depression. Training had
immediate effects on negative mood and rumination but not after recall of a negative autobiographical memory.
Note that training affected memory: Participants falsely recalled inferences presented during the training in a trainingcongruent manner. Moreover, among participants with high levels of depression, training also affected causal inferences
they made for an autobiographical memory retrieved after training. Our findings shed light on negative cognitive cycles
that may contribute to depression.
Keywords
inferential style, cognitive-bias modification, memory, rumination, depression, open data
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The way people think about negative events in their
lives can contribute to their risk for depression, and
several unhelpful modes of thinking have been identified as possible precursors to depressed mood (LeMoult
& Gotlib, 2019). One such thinking pattern is a negative
inferential style that involves habitually making global,
stable, and internal causal inferences about negative
events and inferring negative consequences and negative personal characteristics from their occurrence
(Abramson et al., 1989). Although more than 2 decades
of research have documented the important role of
negative inferential style in depression (for a review,
see Liu et al., 2015), much is still unknown about the
mechanisms through which inferential style exerts its
effects on depression. Recently, there has been a growing appreciation for the joint effects of multiple vulnerabilities such as attention, interpretation, and memory
on the generation and maintenance of depression
(e.g., Everaert & Koster, 2020). Therefore, understanding the interplay between negative causal inferences

and additional cognitive vulnerabilities is imperative.
Inferences are similar to interpretations for events but
are unique in providing personal causal explanations
for events and, in doing so, put people at risk for
depression when faced with negative events (Rubenstein
et al., 2016). When people make inferences, they contemplate the meaning of an unambiguously negative
event. Therefore, inferences are an essential link
between negative contents (i.e., negative events) and
cognitive processes (i.e., inferential style) that together
make depressive cognition rigid and unmalleable
(Vergara-Lopez et al., 2016). Recent advances in the
experimental modification of causal inferences
(Avirbach et al., 2019; Peters et al., 2011) make it possible to examine the causal mechanisms through which
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negative inferences contribute to negative mood and
their interplay with other vulnerability factors in
depression.
In the current study, using a training procedure
designed to modify causal inferences, we examined the
causal effects of modifying inferential style on other
central vulnerability factors in depressed mood. Specifically, we focused on memory processes and rumination,
a repetitive mode of thinking about one’s mood and
symptoms, and assessed whether modifying inferential
style would affect memory and ruminative thinking.
Both have been implicated in depression (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008) and have been linked to causal
inferences.
Looking through the eyes of an individual who experienced a negative life event may clarify the causal
pathways we propose. Following a negative event (e.g.,
being fired from one’s job), a person with a negative
inferential style may make the following causal inferences for the event: “I was fired because I am not an
outgoing person. I am a failure, and I will never be able
to hold on to a job.” Generating such global and abstract
explanations for the event may increase negative mood
as well as ruminative thinking, which similarly involves
self-focused and global thinking about negative events
(e.g., “Why do things keep happening to me the way
they do?” “Why can’t I do things differently?”). Furthermore, this person’s inferential style may affect his or
her memory for the event and for additional similar
events. Supporting the proposed link between negative
inferences and ruminative thinking, cross-sectional and
longitudinal work has demonstrated that a negative
inferential style not only interacts with rumination in
increasing depressive symptoms but also predicts later
levels of rumination (Ciesla et al., 2011; Pössel &
Winkeljohn Black, 2017; Pössel & Pittard, 2019). Negative inferences may directly facilitate ruminative thinking by “feeding” it with negative content but may also
indirectly increase ruminative thinking by facilitating
the more abstract cognition that characterizes ruminative thought (Moberly & Watkins, 2006).
Our thinking concerning the effect of inferential style
emphasizes memory and is based on a long tradition
of research on constructive and reconstructive memory
(e.g., Bartlett, 1932; McClelland, 1995). This approach
argues that memory is not just a cognitive system for
remembering the past by binding together pieces of
information. Instead, memory serves to fill gaps left by
missing pieces and to flexibly combine encoded traces
to construct plausible representations of past events (De
Brigard, 2014; Schacter et al., 2007). Accordingly, inferential style may affect memory by influencing both the
initial experience of the event and its later retrieval. Inferential style may also affect the retrieval of conceptually
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or episodically related events. Indeed, memory is reconstructed when people generate inferences that are subsequently incorporated into event recall (e.g., Chrobak
& Zaragoza, 2013; Rindal et al., 2017). Thus, memory
distortions and confabulations may occur when people
reconstruct or misremember inferences for an event in
line with their habitual inferential style. In our example,
a person with a negative inferential style may recall the
event as “I was fired from my job because I was not
outgoing enough.” In doing so, this person misremembers the source of inference—internally generated
when being fired. In the current research, we predicted
that training people to hold a positive or a negative
inferential style would lead them to misremember
causes for events described in training scenarios in line
with their newly established inferential habit and, thus,
in a training-congruent manner.
Reconstructing information in line with one’s inferential habit may facilitate retrieval of other personal
memories with similar inferences. Specifically, because
for depressed people retrieval is strongly affected by
contextual information (Hitchcock et al., 2018), thinking about negative events and making related negative
inferences for these events may cue them to recall past
events inferred in a similar style. Therefore, we argue
that for depressed individuals, the memorial effects of
making negative inferences about an event may extend
to the recall of causal inferences of other past events.
These memories may be similarly tainted by negative
inferences, congruent with the inferences for the events
that cued their recall. As a result, these memories may
contribute to an increase in negative mood. In our
example, people may recall past events in which they
experienced failure and attributed the failure to not
being outgoing enough, and, as a result, their negative
mood will persist. Thus, in the current research, we
predicted that among depressed participants, the training effects on memory (as observed in training-
congruent confabulations in the negative training
condition) would generalize to their retrieval of negative autobiographical memories. Therefore, we predicted that depressed participants would retrieve
inferences for negative autobiographical memories that
are aligned with their training condition.
The claims we make about the effects of inferences
on memory partially mirror and extend previous work
on the effects of interpretation biases on memory.
When people interpret ambiguous events as negative,
these negative interpretations are later remembered
along with the event, and people misremember the
event in a negative manner that is congruent with their
initial interpretation (Hertel et al., 2008). Although
inferences and interpretation biases are occasionally
regarded as similar processes of assigning meaning to
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events (Hirsch et al., 2016), they are nevertheless distinct (Giuntoli et al., 2019). Interpretation biases focus
on what has happened and often refer to systematically
resolving ambiguity in a benign or a negative manner
(Hirsch et al., 2016). In contrast, maladaptive negative
causal inferences are activated in response to unequivocal negative or positive events (Abramson et al., 2002)
and focus on why an event has happened, thus coloring it with additional meaning. Interpretations and
causal inferences may overlap when an event is disambiguated by inferring causes and intentions for
behavior (e.g., “Your friends come over and leave after
a short while because they . . . are tired / find you
boring”). This example illustrates the intersection of
inference and interpretation but does not represent the
full scope of either phenomenon.
Evidence for the effects of interpretation on memory
was obtained in studies employing cognitive-bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I; e.g., Hertel et al.,
2014). In these studies, participants trained to interpret
ambiguous scenarios positively or negatively exhibited
training-congruent memory biases that reflected their
interpretations ( Joormann et al., 2015; Tran et al., 2011).
Thus, inducing an interpretation bias affects the way
participants encode and later freely recall newly presented ambiguous events. The memory processes we
assess in the current research are different. First,
because the trained causal inferences are made for
unambiguous events, memory confabulations do not
refer to the valence of the event but to the causal inferences made about it. Thus, when training inferential
habit, we expect to affect the recall of previously
encoded inferences in line with the trained inferential
style but not memory for the event itself. Second, in the
current research, memory confabulations do not reflect
interpretations generated and later recalled by the participants. Instead, we assess whether a newly trained
inferential habit results in confabulations when recalling inferential statements presented along with the
training scenarios. Such a training effect points to memory reconstruction (for a similar effect in interpretation
training, see Salemink et al., 2010). Last, a particularly
novel aspect of the current research is an examination
of training effects on recalled inferences about autobiographical memories.
Note that this investigation goes beyond the training
of inferential style to examine its effect on depressed
symptoms and mood. A small number of studies have
used CBM paradigms to test the causal role of negative
inferences on mood (Avirbach et al., 2019; Peters et al.,
2011). In these paradigms, participants are asked to
imagine themselves as the main character in a series of
scenarios. The scenarios depict various negative life
events along with the main character’s causal inferences
for these events. In the positive inferential style
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condition, participants are led to assign a cause that is
unstable, specific, and unrelated to negative self-worth,
whereas in the negative inferential style condition, the
assigned causes are reversed. Inferences are reinforced
by asking participants to complete word fragments and
to answer comprehension questions regarding the
causes for the events. Unlike CBM-I, the word fragments
do not serve to disambiguate the event but to focus
participants’ attention on the trained inference. Recently,
using these procedures, we showed that participants
made training-congruent inferences about their failure
on a cognitive challenge (Avirbach et al., 2019). Moreover, in response to failure, participants’ mood declined
more if they had been trained to make negative inferences than if training had been positive.
In the present research, we used the same CBM
procedure to train participants to make positive or
negative inferences (for a flow chart of the experiment,
see Fig. 1). We predicted that the training would modify
participants’ inferential style, replicating our previous
work. Because in CBM for inferential style participants
are presented with unambiguously negative events, we
expected the training itself to affect mood and state
rumination in line with the training condition (similar
to Avirbach et al., 2019; Peters et al., 2011). We also
expected training to affect the recall of inferential statements presented during training. Thus, participants
should falsely remember inferences concerning the
training scenarios in a training-congruent manner.
Moreover, in line with recent work on the effects of
affective context on retrieval of autobiographical memory in depression (Hitchcock et al., 2018), we expected
that among depressed participants, the training effect
would generalize to the retrieval of a personal memory.
Thus, we predicted that depressed participants would
retrieve inferences for a negative autobiographical
memory in line with their training condition. Finally,
this depression-related effect of the training on autobiographical memory recall is predicted to be reflected
in similar effects on mood and rumination. We expected
changes in inferential style to affect emotional vulnerability (Grafton et al., 2017). Thus, we predicted that
among depressed participants, following the autobiographical memory recall, those in the negative training
condition would report higher levels of negative mood
and engage in more rumination than those in the positive training condition.

Method
Participants
Ninety-one undergraduate students1 at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem (native Hebrew speakers) participated in the study in return for course credit or
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Questionnaires:
ASQ, BDI, RRS
Baseline State Measures
(Mood, Rumination)
Negative-Inferences Training

Positive-Inferences Training

State Measures
(Mood, Rumination)
Assessment of Memory
Confabulations
Autobiographical Memory
Recall Task
State Measures
(Mood, Rumination)
Mood-Neutralizing Task
& Debriefing
Fig. 1. Flow chart of the experiment.

payment. Four participants were excluded as a result
of high error rates (> 30%) on the training task and one
as a result of incomplete data. Thus, the final sample
consisted of 86 participants (65 women and 21 men;
mean age = 23.57 years, SD = 2.26).

Materials
Training paradigm. The training was based on the
procedure described by Avirbach et al. (2019), and there
were several modifications designed to enable us to
examine training effects on memory. The training paradigm included three types of items: training items, probe
items, and critical items (for sample items, see the Supplemental Material available online).
The training items included 38 scenarios depicting
negative events frequently experienced by college students (identical across the two training conditions);
they were equally distributed across social, academic,
and occupational domains (e.g., “During your freshman
year in college, university representatives arrive in class
to describe an interesting new study program. The program sounds extremely attractive, and you decide to
go to the screening day. When the list of accepted
students is published, you see you are not on it.”).
Participants were asked to imagine themselves as the
main character in the scenarios. Each scenario was

presented along with a title and a causal inference
about the event that was congruent with the training
condition. In the negative-inferences training condition,
the inferences were internal, stable, and global and
facilitated inferred negative consequences and negative
self-worth (e.g., “You think to yourself that if you were
more intelligent, you would have gotten accepted. Now
it will be harder for you to get your dream job.”). In
contrast, in the positive-inferences training condition,
they were external, unstable, and specific and did not
facilitate inferred negative consequences and negative
self-worth (e.g., “You think to yourself that all those
who arrived at the screening were outstanding students
and that you will probably have another opportunity
to take part in a similar program.”). In each scenario,
participants were instructed to complete two fragmented words. Unlike in CBM procedures for interpretation, the presented events were not ambiguous, and
the fragmented words did not determine the valence
of the event. Instead, fragmented words were designed
to focus participants’ attention on the intended causal
inference (e.g., “if y_u were more intelligent . . . ” vs.
“ . . . all thos_ who arrived . . . ”). Following each scenario, participants were asked to respond to two yes/
no comprehension questions pertaining to the causal
inferences. These questions served as a reinforcement
of the promoted inferential style and as a measure of
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training fidelity (e.g., “Based on the description, is it
likely that the cause of the event affects other areas in
your life?” yes/no).
Six probe scenarios (identical across the two conditions) were distributed throughout the training as a
measure of training efficacy. These items presented
negative events, but no causal inferences were included.
Therefore, participants’ answers to the yes/no comprehension questions regarding the causal inference for
the event reflected their spontaneous causal inference
and were expected to be training congruent.
Fourteen items, similar in structure to the training
items, served as critical items to be retrieved later in a
memory test. To compare training-congruent errors in
memory (confabulations) across conditions, we constructed these items so that they were the same in the
two training conditions. Half of them consisted of a
negative event followed by a positive causal inference
(congruent with the positive-inferences training condition but incongruent with the negative-inferences training condition), and the other half consisted of a
negative event followed by a negative causal inference
(incongruent with the positive-inferences training condition and congruent with negative-inferences training
condition).
All item types (training, probe, and critical) were
followed by two yes/no comprehension questions. After
each training item, the comprehension question was
followed by accuracy feedback to enhance training.
Feedback was provided on only 80% of the comprehension questions that followed the training items to mask
differences between training, probe, and critical items.
Training commenced with two blocks of five training
items each. Following these blocks, seven additional
blocks were presented; each block consisted of four
training items and two critical items (one training congruent and one training incongruent). The position of
the probe items (17th, 24th, 31st, 38th, 45th, and 52nd
items) was the same for all participants. The specific
identity of training and critical items that were presented in each block was determined at random for
each pair of participants, one assigned to the positiveinferences training condition and the other to the
negative-inferences training condition. This randomization scheme ensured that the order of presentation of
critical items did not differ across the training conditions and would not serve as a confounding variable.
Assessment of memory confabulations. Following the
training, participants were presented with the title and
the first sentence of each of the 14 critical items one at
a time. Participants were asked to recall the event and
write a description of it and then to recall the cause
for the event and write it. Participants’ descriptions
were rated by two independent raters (blind to training
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c ondition), and disagreements were resolved by a third
rater. Although participants were prompted to write separate descriptions of the event and the inference, their
actual descriptions were occasionally mixed. Therefore,
raters coded the full text in several stages. They first compared the recalled event with the training scenario to
determine whether the participant recalled the event, and
misremembered events were not coded further. Then,
they assessed whether an inference was described and
whether it was the same as the originally presented inference. We were mainly interested in instances in which
participants misremembered the original inference and
provided confabulated inferences that were either congruent or incongruent with the inferences promoted in
their training condition. Therefore, these inferences (i.e.,
confabulations) were further coded to indicate whether
they included information consistent with positive and
negative inferences. A confabulation was coded as negative if it contained any of the three features of a negative inference (global, stable, internal). Likewise, it was
coded as positive if it contained any of the three features
of a positive inference (specific, transient, external). Coding of positive and negative confabulations was separate;
therefore, each item could have included both types of
confabulations, and both were counted separately. To
conclude, four measures were derived from this coding
process: the number of correctly remembered events, the
number of correctly remembered inferences, the number
of events containing confabulated positive inferences, and
the number of events containing confabulated negative
inferences. For ratings of the causal inferences, κ was .95.
Autobiographical memory recall. Participants were
asked to recall and write about a recent personal event
that took place 2 to 4 weeks before the experiment and
made them feel remorse or dejection (for a similar procedure, see Daches et al., 2019). Next, they were asked
to think about and describe the causes of the event and
its personal importance as well as the implications of the
event for their future.
The causal inferences in the autobiographical reports
were rated by two independent raters (blind to training
condition) on the three dimensions of causal inferences
(internality, stability, and globality) using the content
analysis of verbatim explanations (CAVE) method
(Schulman et al., 1989). Disagreements were resolved
by a third rater. Higher scores reflect a more stable,
global, and internal causal inference. For CAVE ratings,
κ was .74, comparable with the original interrater reliability reported by Schulman et al. (1989).
Self-report measures.
Trait measures. Participants completed a set of trait
measures, including the Beck Depression Inventory–II
(BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996; Cronbach’s α in the current

Perlman et al.

6
study = .93), the Attributional Style Questionnaire2
(ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982; Cronbach’s α in the current
study = .82), and the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS;
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Cronbach’s α in the
current study = .88). Because of our focus on inferences
for negative events, only the six negative items from the
ASQ were administered.
State measures. Participants completed state measures
assessing mood and rumination.3 Mood was assessed
(as in Avirbach et al., 2019) with three items measuring
happy mood and three items measuring sad mood (e.g.,
“Right now, I feel sad”; “Right now, I feel happy”). Adjectives were taken from the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994). State rumination was assessed with four items from the Momentary Ruminative Self-Focus Inventory4 (MRSI; Mor et al.,
2013): “Right now, I wonder why I always feel the way I
do.” “Right now, I am thinking: Why can’t I handle things
better?” “Right now, it is hard for me to shut off negative
thoughts about myself,” and “Right now, I dwell on negative aspects of myself that I wish I’d stop thinking about.”
These items were selected because they do not probe for
causal inferences. Mood and state rumination items were
intermixed and rated using a 10-cm-long visual analogue
scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely). The
internal reliability for the state measures in the current
study was good (αs range = .87–.94).

Procedure
Participants completed the BDI-II, ASQ, and RRS online
up to 9 days (M = 1.78 days, SD = 1.84) before the lab
session. When they arrived at the lab, they completed
a set of state measures of mood and rumination. Subsequently, participants were randomly assigned to one
of two training conditions: a negative or a positiveinferences training condition. After the training, participants completed another set of state measures (mood
and rumination), followed by the assessment of training-
congruent memory confabulations and the autobiographical memory recall task. Then, participants
completed a third set of state measures (mood and
rumination). Finally, participants completed a moodneutralizing task and were debriefed. On average, the
experiment took 90 min to complete.

Results
Participant characteristics
For descriptive statistics, see Table 1. Participants in the
two conditions did not differ in gender ratio or on any
of the baseline trait and state measures. Although we

predicted that depression levels would mostly moderate
training effects on recalled inferences for the autobiographical memory and the subsequent change in mood
and rumination, to keep analyses consistent, standardized BDI-II scores were included as a covariate in all
analyses. Significant interactions with BDI-II scores
were probed using a median split to define groups of
lower BDI-II scores (M = 3.38, SD = 2.63, range = 0–8)
and higher BDI-II scores (M = 17.51, SD = 8.52, range =
9–48). The mean score on the BDI-II was 10.37 (SD =
9.89, range = 0–48), and 29 participants had scores
above 13, indicative of mild levels of depression or
above.

Training fidelity and efficacy
To measure training fidelity, we assessed accuracy levels on the comprehension questions for training scenarios. Accuracy rates on the comprehension questions
were submitted to an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
with condition as a between-subjects factor and standardized BDI-II scores entered as a covariate. High accuracy
rates were found for both conditions (positive-inferences
training condition: M = 83.79, SD = 4.49; negative-
inferences training conditions: M = 85.77, SD = 5.28).
The main effects of condition, BDI-II scores, and their
interaction were not significant (all ps > .05). Thus,
training fidelity was comparable across conditions.
We then examined whether the training was successful in promoting the intended inferential style. To do
so, we assessed participants’ yes/no responses to the
comprehension questions on the probe items, which
reflected participants’ (positive vs. negative) spontaneous causal inferences for the events. For descriptive
statistics, see Table 1. The proportion of positive causal
inferences (or the reverse for negative) served as an
index of training efficacy and was submitted to an
ANCOVA with condition as a between-subjects factor
and standardized BDI-II scores entered as a covariate.
The interaction between condition and BDI-II scores
was significant,5 F(1, 82) = 11.65, p = .001, ηp2 = .13.
To explore the interaction, we used a median split
to define groups of lower BDI-II scores (M = 3.38, SD =
2.63) and higher BDI-II scores (M = 17.51, SD = 8.52).
Probing the interaction using a median split revealed
that across depression groups, participants made more
positive inferences in the positive-inferences training
condition compared with the negative-inferences training
condition, but this effect was larger among participants
with higher BDI-II scores, t(39) = 6.02, p < .001, d = 1.95
(positive condition: M = 0.78, SD = 0.14; negative condition: M = 0.41, SD = 0.23), than among participants with
lower BDI-II scores, t(43) = 2.02, p = .05, d = 0.59 (positive condition: M = 0.72, SD = 0.11; negative condition:
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Table 1. Trait Measures and Outcome Variables
Variable

Negative-inferences training
(n = 43)

ASQ
BDI-II
RRS
Proportion of positive inferences
(training efficacy index)
Critical items
Number of correctly recalled events
Number of correctly recalled inferences
Number of positive confabulations
Number of negative confabulations
Autobiographical recall CAVE ratings
Negative mood
Pretraining
Posttraining
Postautobiographical recall
State rumination
Pretraining
Posttraining
Postautobiographical recall

Positive-inferences training
(n = 43)

4.51
10.74
45.65
0.53

(0.80)
(10.85)
(15.79)
(0.24)

4.36
9.49
44.35
0.75

(.71)
(7.74)
(11.60)
(0.13)

12.65
7.81
1.33
4.51
3.51

(1.27)
(2.44)
(1.41)
(2.35)
(1.33)

12.47
8.09
4.28
1.44
3.21

(1.33)
(2.39)
(2.26)
(1.08)
(1.15)

19.85 (19.37)
31.50 (23.40)
36.96 (27.28)

19.32 (19.14)
20.85 (18.22)
30.18 (20.86)

20.82 (21.03)
31.42 (25.14)
37.86 (29.66)

23.00 (22.14)
23.50 (20.87)
30.20 (23.16)

Note: Values are means with standard deviations in parentheses. ASQ = Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peterson
et al., 1982); BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory–II (Beck et al., 1996); RRS = Rumination Response Scale (NolenHoeksema & Morrow, 1991); CAVE = content analysis of verbatim explanations; autobiographical recall CAVE ratings =
autobiographical recall content coding. Higher CAVE ratings represent a more stable, global, and internal inferential style.

M = 0.62, SD = 0.62). Moreover, whereas in the negative-inferences training condition participants with
higher BDI-II scores made fewer positive inferences
than did participants with lower BDI-II scores, t(41) =
3.19, p = .003, d = 0.98, the two depression groups did
not differ in the positive-inferences training condition,
t(41) = −1.52, p = .135, d = 0.47. Thus, although training
efficacy was demonstrated in both groups, promoting
a negative inferential style more strongly affected the
performance of the more “depressed” participants.

Training effects on memory
confabulations
We first assessed accuracy rates of recalled critical scenarios. As expected, all the effects were nonsignificant,
including the main effects of condition, BDI-II scores,
and their interaction (all ps > .05). We then assessed
accuracy rates of recalled inferences. As expected, all
the effects were nonsignificant, including the main
effects of condition, BDI-II scores, and their interaction
(all ps > .05). Thus, as expected, accuracy rates of recalling the critical items did not vary across the two conditions or by BDI-II scores. For descriptive statistics for
the critical scenarios, including accuracy rates and
memory confabulations, see Table 1.

To examine the effect of the training, we submitted
the number of confabulated causal inferences across
the 14 critical scenarios (both negative and positive, as
presented) to a mixed-design ANCOVA with factors for
training condition and judged valence of the recall
error. Standardized BDI-II scores were entered as a
covariate. The main effects were nonsignificant, but the
predicted interaction between condition and valence
of recall error was significant, F(1, 82) = 113.97, p <
.001, ηp2 = .582. The three-way interaction was not
significant, F(1, 82) = 2.15, p = .146, ηp2 = .026.
Aimed at understanding the Condition × Judged Confabulation Valence interaction, we ran t tests that
revealed that as expected, compared with participants
in the negative-inferences training condition, participants in the positive-inferences training condition
p roduced more positive confabulations, t(84) = 7.27,
p < .001, d = 1.57, and fewer negative confabulations,
t(84) = −7.78, p < .001, d = 1.68.
To rule out the possibility that this effect can be
attributed to the effects of training on negative mood,
we ran the same model with negative mood after training included as a mediator. Although the direct effect
of condition on both types of confabulations was significant, the indirect effect of training on the recall of
inferences made for the autobiographical memory via
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negative mood was not. Thus, training effects on confabulations cannot be attributed to mood. For the full
results, see the Supplemental Material.

Causal inferences for the recalled
autobiographical memory
We examined the prediction that participants in the
negative training condition would make more negative
causal inferences for their autobiographical memories
than would participants in the positive-inferences training condition. To do so, judges’ CAVE ratings of participants’ causal inferences for their negative autobiographical
memory were submitted to an ANCOVA with condition
as a between-subjects factor and standardized BDI-II
scores entered as a covariate. For descriptive statistics
for the CAVE ratings, see Table 1. Five participants did
not describe a specific event, and their data were not
considered in this analysis.
The only significant outcome was the interaction
between condition and BDI-II scores, F(1, 77) = 7.18,
p = .009, ηp2 = .085. Follow-up analyses revealed that
as expected, participants with higher BDI-II scores in
the positive-inferences training condition made fewer
negative causal inferences about their autobiographical
memory (M = 3.05, SD = 1.21) than did similar participants in the negative-inferences training condition (M =
4.03, SD = 1.32), t(37) = −2.42, p = .021, d = 0.78. In
contrast, participants with lower BDI-II scores in the
positive-inferences training condition and negativeinferences training condition did not differ in the negativity of causal inferences they made about their
autobiographical memories, t(40) = 0.72, p = .477, d =
0.22 (positive-inferences training condition: M = 3.39,
SD = 1.08; negative-inferences training condition: M =
3.13, SD = 1.23). Thus, recalled causal inferences for a
past negative event were training congruent among
participants with higher BDI-II scores but not among
participants with lower BDI-II scores.
To rule out the possibility that this effect can be
attributed to the effects of training on negative mood,
we ran the same model with negative mood after the
training included as a mediator. Whereas the direct
effect of condition on CAVE ratings was still significantly moderated by levels of depression, the indirect
effect of training on the recall of inferences for the
autobiographical memory via negative mood was not.
For the full results, see the Supplemental Material.

Negative mood
Negative mood scores were submitted to a mixed-design
ANCOVA with training condition as a between-subjects
factor, measurement time as a within-subjects factor

(pretraining, posttraining, postautobiographical recall),
and standardized BDI-II scores as a covariate. The interaction between condition and time was significant, F(2,
81) = 4.82, p = .010, ηp2 = .106, but the three-way interaction between condition, BDI-II scores, and time was
not, F(2, 81) = 1.37, p = .260, ηp2 = .033 (see Fig. 2).
Analyses within each training condition revealed an
expected increase in negative mood ratings in the
n egative-inferences training condition following the
training, t(42) = 4.63, p < .001, d = 0.71, and an additional increase from posttraining to postautobiographical memory recall, t(42) = 2.45, p = .019, d = 0.37. In
the positive-inferences training condition, negative
mood did not change following training, t(42) = 0.75,
p = .454, d = 0.12, but as one might expect, there was
a significant increase in negative mood from posttraining to postautobiographical memory recall, t(42) = 3.64,
p = .001, d = 0.55. Between-groups analyses revealed
a nonsignificant group difference at baseline, t(84) =
0.13, p = .899, d = 0.03. However, as expected, a significant group difference was found following training,
t(84) = 2.36, p = .021, d = 0.51, indicative of lower levels
of negative mood among participants in the positiveinferences training condition compared with participants in the negative-inferences training condition.
Unexpectedly, no significant difference was found at
postautobiographical memory recall, t(84) = 1.29, p =
.199, d = 0.28. Thus, whereas in the positive-inferences
training condition participants’ negative mood increased
only at postautobiographical memory recall, participants’ negative mood in the negative-inferences training
condition increased following both the training and the
autobiographical recall.

State rumination
State rumination scores were submitted to a mixeddesign ANCOVA with training condition as a betweensubjects factor, measurement time as a within-subjects
factor (pretraining, posttraining, and postautobiographical recall), and standardized BDI-II scores as a covariate. The predicted interaction between condition and
time was significant, F(2, 81) = 4.43, p = .015, ηp2 = .10,
but the three-way interaction between condition, BDI-II
scores, and time was not, F(2, 81) = 0.48, p = .621, ηp2 =
.012 (see Fig. 2).
In analyzing scores within each training condition—
to understand the significant interaction—we found the
expected posttraining increase in ruminative thinking
in the negative training condition, t(42) = 3.68, p = .001,
d = 0.56, and an additional increase from posttraining
to postautobiographical recall, t(42) = 2.79, p = .008,
d = 0.43. In the positive training condition, ruminative
thinking did not change following training, t(42) = 0.26,
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Fig. 2. State negative mood (left) and state rumination (right) presented as a function of condition. Error bars represent
± 1 SE from the mean. Post AMR refers to postautobiographical memory recall.

p = .796, d = 0.04, but there was a significant increase
in ruminative thinking from posttraining to postautobiographical recall, t(42) = 3.27, p = .002, d = 0.50.
Other analyses revealed no differences between the
two training groups at baseline, t(84) = 0.47, p = .641,
d = 0.10; following the training, t(84) = −1.59, p = .116,
d = 0.34; or at postautobiographical memory recall,
t(84) = −1.33, p = .186, d = 0.29. Thus, whereas in the
negative-inferences training condition state rumination
increased following both the training and the autobiographical recall, in the positive-inferences training
condition, it increased only at postautobiographical
memory recall.

Associations among outcome measures
To examine whether the effect of training on inferences
was related to training effects on the other outcomes,
we examined correlations between training efficacy,
memory confabulations, negative mood, rumination,
and retrieved inferences on the autobiographical recall.
Training efficacy (measured by the proportion of positive responses on the probe items) was negatively
linked to negative memory confabulations and positively linked to positive confabulations (see Table 2).
Likewise, positive confabulations were negatively correlated with negative mood and state rumination following the training.

Discussion
The current study was designed to examine the effects
of inference training on the recall of inferences in
experimental scenarios, inferences for autobiographical memories, negative mood, and ruminative thinking.
Participants’ spontaneous causal inferences for negative events (probe items) were congruent with their
training condition. In addition, participants provided

confabulated memories that consisted of causal inferences of events that were misremembered in line with
their induced inferential style. As expected, differences
in mood and rumination were found following the
training phase. Unexpectedly, group differences in
mood and rumination were not observed following the
autobiographical recall procedure. Participants in the
positive inferential style condition experienced a similar increase in negative mood and in ruminative thinking after recalling a negative personal event, as did
participants in the negative inferential style condition.
Note that levels of depression moderated the effect of
training on recalled inferences for negative autobiographical memories. Thus, only participants with
higher levels of depression recalled more negative
inferences about their autobiographical memory in the
negative compared with the positive-inferences training condition.
Findings from the current research replicate those in
previous work (Avirbach et al., 2019; Peters et al., 2011)
by demonstrating the effects of CBM on inferences and
showing that CBM can target a negative cognitive style.
These beneficial effects can pave the way for investigations involving clinical populations and for the assessment of long-term effects of the training. Indeed,
despite the centrality of negative inferences to the
understanding of depression, very few interventions to
reduce such inferences are available (Marchetti et al.,
2019). Furthermore, being able to manipulate causal
inferences using an experimental design opens the gate
to examining inferences as part of the appraisal process
of events rather than as a trait-like cognitive style. The
training effect on negative mood and on ruminative thinking supports the notion that causal inferences may play
a role in emotion regulation (Peterson & Park, 2007).
The main contribution of the current work lies in the
causal linking of inferential style with memory processes. The effects of causal inferences on memory
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Table 2. Correlations Among Outcome Measures Following the Training
Measure
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Training efficacy
Positive confabulations
Negative confabulations
CAVE ratings
Negative mood following training
Rumination following training

1

2

3

4

5

—
.39***
−.42***
−.07
−.27*
−.28**

—
−.42***
−.02
−.22*
−.13

—
.21
.17
.08

—
.31**
.34**

—
.81***

Note: Training efficacy was expressed as the proportion of answers to probe items that reflect
a positive inferential style. Positive confabulations is the number of confabulations containing
positive causal inferences. Content analysis of verbatim explanations (CAVE) ratings are judges’
ratings of participants’ causal inferences for their negative autobiographical memory.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

processes are in line with previous theory and empirical
findings concerning depression-related habits of
thought (Hertel, 2004). Our results may be seen as an
extension of the combined cognitive bias hypothesis
of Hirsch et al. (2006) and its application to depression
(Everaert et al., 2012) to the domain of inferences.
Repeated experiences in making negative inferences
lead people to generate habitual inferences and misremember the causes of events in line with their newly
formed habit of thinking. Such memory errors may have
significant effects on people’s emotional experiences
by coloring already negative events in even darker colors. Thus, emotional events are reconstructed in memory via the inferences people make.
Note that although the habit that was formed among
participants with lower levels of depression was
restricted to scenario recall, the ramifications for participants with higher levels of depression were more
substantial. For those participants, repeatedly making
negative inferences carried over to new circumstances,
such as when recalling inferences for a past autobiographical negative event. This interplay between inferences and memory retrieval may be seen as an example
of the negative vicious cycle that characterizes the
experience of depression. Although dynamic interactions among biases in attention, interpretation, and
memory have been described as contributing to depression (Everaert et al., 2020), negative inferences have
been typically examined in isolation.
People with depression are characterized by disturbances in autobiographical memory: They gravitate
toward negative memories, have difficulty accessing
positive memories, and have reduced access to specific
details of past events (Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler,
2014). Our findings suggest that autobiographical memories of people with and without depression may differ
in additional ways. Having established a habit of negative inferences, depressed participants retrieved negative inferences for past negative events.

Two possible mechanisms may have led to this
retrieval pattern. One possibility is that the training
affected the selective retrieval of events. Thus, creating
a habit of assigning negative causal inferences may
have facilitated the retrieval of events for which the
person has previously made negative inferences.
Although we did not assess whether the trained inferential habit contributes to depressed people’s preferential retrieval of negative (as opposed to positive)
memories, such an effect would be consistent with the
selective retrieval mechanism. Furthermore, because
negative inferential style involves abstract thinking,
which may impede retrieval of specific memories (Raes
et al., 2008), the selective retrieval mechanism may be
related to the reduced autobiographical memory specificity phenomenon. A second possibility is that the
causal inference made for the autobiographical memory
was reconstructed at the time of retrieval in a manner
comparable with the temporary inferential habit generated by the training. This possibility suggests that
although events may be encoded with a causal inference, the activation of a negative inferential style among
individuals prone to depression may override this
encoding, leading to retrieval of a different inference
that fits the person’s present inferential style. This pattern may explain additional retrieval effects seen in
depressed people, such as their inability to use positive
memories as a means for mood repair ( Joormann et al.,
2007). Although we assessed only the recall of negative
events, the current findings suggest that the additional
meaning depressed individuals attach to recalled events
may increase negative mood independently of the
valence of the event. Clearly, additional research is
needed to further the understanding of this causal link.
Our predictions concerning training effects on mood
and state rumination were only partially supported. As
predicted, repeated processing of events with a certain
inferential style affected mood and ruminative thinking
immediately following the training, but it did not carry
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over to changes following the recall of a negative autobiographical memory. Instead, following the autobiographical recall, participants in both training conditions
experienced increases in negative mood and rumination. It is possible that the lack of a filler task to neutralize mood before the autobiographical recall has
limited the ability to properly examine these changes.
Moreover, training effects following an emotional challenge are not always observed (e.g., Joormann et al.,
2015). Such effects depend on the nature of the emotional challenge (Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014), the
training paradigm, and the assessment. In our previous
work (Avirbach et al., 2019), we reported a training
effect on mood following the emotional challenge of
failing a cognitive task. As indicated by a recent synthesis of affect-induction procedures ( Joseph et al.,
2020), an autobiographical memory recall yields much
stronger effects on mood than does a failure induction,
perhaps limiting the training’s capacity to modify the
emotional response. Furthermore, the timing of the
assessment following a negative event may be critical
given that powerful stressors are associated with
delayed depressive responses (Abela, 2002). Thus, it is
possible that emotional or cognitive depressogenic
responses following the autobiographical recall may
not emerge until later (Perlman & Mor, 2021).
A number of limitations of the current research
should be noted. First, in Avirbach et al. (2019), we
assessed training effects on inferential style (target
engagement) via inferences participants made for new
scenarios. In contrast, in the current study, we relied
only on probe items for this purpose. We reasoned that
the confabulations in recalling training scenarios serve
as a proxy measure for this purpose, akin to the procedure used in Hertel et al. (2014). The lack of an
independent measure that relies on new scenarios may
limit the ability to gauge whether changes in inferential
style mediate training effect on additional outcome
measures. Second, participants were trained to adopt
either a negative or a positive inferential style, and a
no-training condition was not included in our design.
Without a no-training control condition, the source of
the training effect is undetermined—it can be the positive training, the negative training, or both, and further
research should tease these apart. Third, we relied on
mediational analyses to exclude the possibility that
training effects on mood accounted for the effects on
memory. However, allowing mood to dissipate before
assessing memory, via the use of a filler task, may be
a more powerful way to eliminate the possible effect
of mood. Fourth, depression was assessed several days
before the training session. Although the average interval was short, future research should aspire to further
minimize the gap between questionnaire administration
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and the experimental session. Fifth, as a result of exclusions, the number of participants in the analyses pertaining to autobiographical memory fell slightly below
that required to provide the desired power (i.e., power
of 80% to reject a false null hypothesis). This underscores
the importance of verifying in future research, ideally
using a larger sample, that the presently observed pattern
of findings is replicable. Finally, considering our promising and substantial findings with an unselected student
sample in a single session design, future research should
examine training causal inferences in a sample of individuals with clinical levels of depression as well as longterm effects of multiple session training.
Effective CBM procedures that target depression are
still needed ( Jones & Sharpe, 2017). Because the current training procedure targets cognitive processes central to depression, it may offer a promising avenue for
intervention. Contributing to the potential of this CBM
procedure is the fact that its training effects have generalized to the processing of an autobiographical memory as well as to causal inferences and emotional
responses concerning a failure experience (Avirbach
et al., 2019). In addition, changes to causal inferences
may have ripple effects in decreasing ruminative
thought and negative memory biases, suggesting that
causal inferences may be a key point to intervene.
Together, these effects may contribute to preventing or
decreasing depression.
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Notes
1. Sample size was based on power analyses in which we
assumed a medium effect size (d = 0.6) and α value of .05.
A sample size of 86 provided power of at least 1 − β = .80 to
detect each of the predicted effects.
2. The ASQ measure was selected over the Cognitive Style
Questionnaire (Haeffel et al., 2008) because of time constraints.
It does not assess inferences concerning consequences and selfworth. However, random assignment to training conditions makes
a priori group differences in these dimensions highly unlikely.
3. For exploratory reasons, state hope was also measured using
the Adult State Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1996), but results pertaining to this measure are not reported here.
4. At the time of constructing this study, the Brief State Rumination
Inventory (Marchetti et al., 2018) was not yet available.
5. In all analyses, significant lower order effects that were qualified by significant higher order effects are not reported.
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